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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________  
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.  
 
 In these consolidated appeals, the government 
challenges the sentences given to Steven Campbell and 
Abdulrasheed Yusuf, both of whom pled guilty to their 
respective crimes.  As part of their plea agreements, Campbell 
and Yusuf each agreed not to argue for a sentence outside the 
range recommended by the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines.  The government contends that both defendants 
breached their plea agreements by in fact seeking sentences 
below the guidelines-recommended ranges.   
 
 Although the facts of these two cases provide a useful 
contrast, ultimately, we conclude that the government’s 
contentions are well founded in both.  Accordingly, we will 
vacate Campbell’s and Yusuf’s sentences and remand for 
resentencing.       
 
 Campbell also cross-appeals, arguing that evidence 
discovered during the traffic stop leading to his arrest should 
have been suppressed because the stop violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  The District Court rejected his arguments, 
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holding that the police officer involved was justified in 
stopping Campbell’s vehicle and did not impermissibly extend 
the duration of the stop.  Because we agree that the traffic stop 
was conducted within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment, 
we will affirm the order denying suppression.  
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. Federal Sentencing  
  
 As context for the case histories that follow, we briefly 
note the legal framework that governs sentencing.  Federal 
courts follow a well-established three-step process to 
determine the sentence in any given case.  United States v. 
Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2011).  First, the court 
calculates the defendant’s non-binding sentencing range as 
provided by the sentencing guidelines.  Id.  The range is a 
function of the defendant’s offense level and his criminal 
history points, which are respectively determined by the 
particular facts of the case and the defendant’s past behavior, 
all as viewed through the substantive rules set forth in the 
guidelines.  See Guidelines Manual 2018, United States 
Sentencing Commission, 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-
manual/2018/GLMFull.pdf.   Second, the court considers 
whether one or more departure provisions of the guidelines are 
applicable, warranting a sentence outside of the ordinarily 
recommended range.  See Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247.  Finally, the 
court looks to the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 3553(a),1 to determine whether, as a matter of discretion, a 
variance from the recommended range is appropriate.2  Id.           
 
 With that framework in mind, we turn to the details of 
the cases before us.   
 
 
1 The seven factors a court must consider under 
§ 3553(a) are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the 
need for the sentence imposed to reflect the four primary 
purposes of sentencing, i.e., retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation; (3) the kinds of sentences 
available (e.g., whether probation is prohibited or a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment is required by statute); (4) the 
sentencing range established through application of the 
sentencing guidelines and the types of sentences available 
under the guidelines; (5) any relevant “policy statements” 
promulgated by the Commission; (6) the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; 
and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the 
offense.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  
 
2 A “variance” is a sentence that deviates from the 
guidelines range based on the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.  A 
“departure,” on the other hand, is a sentence that differs from 
the guidelines range based on specific guidelines provisions 
that authorize such changes.  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 
237, 247 n.10 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 
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B. Steven Campbell 
 
Campbell was arrested following a traffic stop when it 
was discovered that he was unlawfully in possession of 
firearms.  He had been driving home from work, when a police 
officer pulled behind him at a stop light and noticed that his 
license plate was partially obstructed.  The officer checked the 
number on the plate against a law enforcement database and 
saw that Campbell, who was listed as the owner of the car, had 
had his license suspended the month before.  When the light 
turned green and Campbell turned the corner, the officer 
verified that Campbell was driving the car from the photograph 
on record.     
 
The officer then pulled Campbell over and asked for his 
license, registration, and insurance card.  As Campbell began 
searching for his registration and insurance card, he 
unintentionally revealed a handgun in the center console.  The 
officer thought he saw a gun but “wasn’t 100 percent sure at 
that point[.]”  (JA at 108.)  When Campbell produced his 
insurance card, the officer saw that it was expired.  Campbell 
next produced his vehicle registration.  He then continued 
looking for an up-to-date insurance card, and the officer 
suggested he look in the center console.  While Campbell was 
searching the center console a second time, the officer saw the 
gun more clearly.  Campbell also opened the glove box, and 
the officer observed a second gun there.  Upon seeing the 
second gun, the officer drew his firearm and asked Campbell 
to put his hands on the steering wheel.  At that point, the officer 
placed Campbell under arrest.  Up to that point, the stop had 




Campbell as a convicted felon was prohibited from 
possessing guns.  He was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for 
possessing the two guns and ammunition.  He filed a motion to 
suppress, arguing that the officer lacked probable cause for a 
search and arrest.  The government opposed that motion, and, 
following a suppression hearing, the District Court denied it.     
 
Campbell ultimately entered into a plea agreement 
which included a limited right of appeal, permitting him to seek 
review of the suppression ruling.  The agreement also noted 
that Campbell and the government agreed “that the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines are not binding upon the 
Court[,]” but “that the Court should sentence Campbell within 
the Guidelines range that results from the total Guidelines 
offense level” specified in the agreement.  (JA at 199.)  In 
addition, “[t]he parties agree[d] not to seek or argue for any 
upward or downward departure, adjustment or variance” and 
“that a sentence within the Guidelines range that results from 
the agreed … offense level is reasonable.”  (JA at 199.)  The 
parties agreed that the guidelines offense level was 18, 
resulting in a guidelines range of 30 to 37 months of 
imprisonment.3     
 
 
 3 The Presentence Investigation Report from the U.S. 
Probation Office concluded that Campbell’s criminal history 
score was three, resulting in a category II criminal history 
designation.  Although not expressly agreed to in the plea 
agreement, the parties did not dispute that designation, and it 
is the one that, when combined with an offense level of 18, 
yields a range of 30 to 37 months on the guidelines sentencing 
table.   
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Despite the agreement not to seek a departure or 
variance, when Campbell’s counsel filed a sentencing 
memorandum, he reminded the District Court of its discretion 
to look beyond the guidelines.  He closed the memorandum by 
saying, “the only question left to answer is does one treat 
Steven Campbell by the calculated Guideline formula or by an 
appreciation of the person [] he has become.”  (JA at 221-23.)  
The sentencing memorandum also included letters of support 
asking for leniency in sentencing, some plainly asking for a 
non-custodial sentence.  The government did not object to 
those statements in its subsequent sentencing memorandum 
and said instead that, “[i]n accordance with the terms of the 
plea agreement, Campbell has not sought a variance[.]”  (JA at 
268.) 
 
At the sentencing hearing, Campbell’s counsel again 
emphasized the importance of the § 3553(a) factors, saying he 
did so “despite whatever the plea agreement says between the 
Government and my client and I [sic.]”  (JA at 280.)  He also 
described the guidelines range as “the starting point obviously 
… and that’s just it, a starting point.”  (JA at 280.)  When he 
had a chance to put Campbell himself on record, counsel asked 
what Campbell thought a just punishment would be for his 
offense, and Campbell, addressing the Court, said, “I would 
hope Your Honor would consider probation, house arrest, 
community service, anything other than jail time.”  (JA at 287.)   
 
The government objected to that statement, based on the 
plea agreement.  Campbell’s attorney said, “[w]e stand by the 
plea agreement[,]” and he claimed he had “not raised any issue 
as to the guideline range[,]” but he again emphasized that the 
District Court “has the right to make the decision as to what 
sentence my client receives.”  (JA at 288.)  The District Court 
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responded by noting that “this is probably not the case” where 
such comments are “appropriate[,]” but it let the defense 
continue presenting testimony and argument.  (JA at 288-89.)  
When he continued, Campbell’s attorney asked Campbell why 
the judge “should give [him] a break?”  (JA at 289.)  Campbell 
responded that “jail will [have] a totally negative effect on 
everything I have tried to do in recent years.”  (JA at 289.) 
Campbell went on to ask the Court to “grant [him] any 
punishment, except for jail time[.]”  (JA at 290.)   
 
When Campbell and his attorney finished their 
presentation, the government again objected, this time pointing 
to defense counsel’s question about “a break” and Campbell’s 
final plea for any sentence other than jail.  (JA at 291-92.)  
Without speaking further on the government’s objection, the 
District Court sentenced Campbell to a term of imprisonment 
of one year and a day, followed by three years of supervised 
release, the time in prison being roughly a third of the time 
called for by the sentencing range which Campbell had agreed 
not to contest.  In explaining the sentence, the District Court 
noted the efforts Campbell had made to turn his life around 
following earlier offenses and then observed that “the tenuous 
and perhaps fragile hold a person, a former offender, has on 
rehabilitation can be toppled … perhaps easily.”  (JA at 300.)   
 
C. Abdulrasheed Yusuf 
 
In August 2017, Yusuf participated in a scheme to steal 
money from accounts at various financial institutions.  His co-
conspirators would impersonate account holders and withdraw 
or transfer funds.  Yusuf’s role was to pick up and deposit the 
resulting checks in co-conspirators’ bank accounts using 
fraudulent identification.  When Yusuf was arrested, he had in 
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his possession the driver’s license of someone he intended to 
impersonate, as well as the license of another individual whom 
he had impersonated in the past.   
 
Yusuf pled guilty to a two-count information charging 
him, in Count 1, with conspiracy to commit wire fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and, in Count 2, with aggravated 
identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).  The plea 
agreement included a provision stating, “that neither [Yusuf 
nor the U.S. Attorney’s Office] will argue for the imposition of 
a sentence outside the Guidelines range that results from the 
agreed total Guidelines offense level.”  (JA at 333.)  In 
addition, “[t]he parties agree not to seek or argue for any 
upward or downward departure, adjustment or variance not set 
forth herein.”  (JA at 334.)  The U.S. Attorney’s office was also 
careful to ensure that it reserved the right to respond to 
questions from the court, correct misinformation provided to 
the court, and provide the sentencing judge with all 
information relevant to sentencing.  The plea agreement further 
recognized that, notwithstanding its provisions, the 
“sentencing judge may impose any reasonable sentence” (JA 
at 327) and that “[t]his agreement … cannot and does not bind 
the sentencing judge, who may make independent factual 
findings and may reject any or all of the stipulations entered 
into by the parties.”  (JA at 328.)   
 
Yusuf ended up being sentenced twice, and, for reasons 
not apparent in the record, he was sentenced by a different 
judge than was his co-conspirator Temilade Adekunle, who 
was charged with and convicted of the same crimes, based on 
essentially the same conduct.  At Yusuf’s first sentencing, the 
District Court granted a downward variance, imposing a 
sentence of three months on Count 1 (the wire fraud 
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conspiracy) and a mandatory 24 months on Count 2 (the 
aggravated identity theft).  United States v. Yusuf, 781 F. App’x 
77, 79 (3d Cir. 2019).  We vacated that sentence because the 
District Court impermissibly considered the mandatory 24-
month sentence under Count 2 when calculating the 
appropriate sentence on Count 1.  Id. at 80-81.  The case was 
thus remanded for resentencing.   
 
 By the time Yusuf appeared for resentencing, his co-
conspirator Adekunle had already been sentenced to 26 months 
for the same two crimes.  At Yusuf’s resentencing, defense 
counsel began by saying that he was “to some degree, governed 
by the plea agreement in this matter, and the reasonableness of 
the range per the plea agreement[,]” but he nevertheless went 
on to say that the co-conspirator’s sentence “is something that 
we can’t close our eyes to.”  (JA at 427.)  He said that Yusuf 
and Adekunle were “involved in the same incident, culpable 
for the same conduct, essentially” but that the government’s 
recommended minimum sentence of 21 months for Count 1 
was “ten times the amount of time” the co-defendant was 
sentenced to.  (JA at 429-30.)  He also said that the time Yusuf 
had already served – five months – was “two and a half times 
more than the time that Mr. Adekunle got.”  (JA at 429.)  He 
concluded that he “just [didn’t] see how we can all stand here 
and say, well, that somehow is a way, you know, the way this 
rolls out.”  (JA at 430.) 
 
 The District Court responded that defense counsel’s 
statement was “not only the one that most benefits your client, 
but also one that makes perfect commonsense because we do 
have … the anomaly of two low level folks who clearly are a 
part, and the government has told me they are a part of” the 
same conspiracy.  (JA at 430.)  She then asked the government 
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to provide more information about the conspiracy, which it did.  
The government agreed that Adekunle had played a 
comparable role in the conspiracy as had Yusuf, but it noted 
that the difference between the two defendants was their 
criminal history categories: Yusuf had a criminal history 
category of three, and Adekunle had a criminal history 
category of one.  The District Court then noted some concern 
that Adekunle’s sentence had been influenced by Yusuf’s 
original sentence which had since been overturned.    
 
 When the Assistant U.S. Attorney was asked about the 
proportionality of the sentences given to Adekunle and Yusuf, 
he began by saying, “for the record … the government believes 
defense counsel has clearly breached the plea.  He is not 
allowed to argue for a departure or a variance.”  (JA at 438.)  
The Court disagreed, saying, “He is arguing proportionality.  
[Defense counsel] is way too smart to walk into that trap.  He 
is doing everything but.  And I am almost forcing him to do it.  
It is fair for him to argue proportionality . . . . [s]o I don’t find 
he’s breached the agreement.”  (JA at 439.)   
 
 The District Court then engaged in an extended 
colloquy with Yusuf about his post-conviction conduct.  While 
in prison, Yusuf had participated in substance abuse classes, 
including attending additional classes even after he received 
his certificate of completion, and was more than two years 
sober.   
 
In imposing its sentence for Count 1, the District Court 
began by noting that much of Yusuf’s criminal history was 
driven by crimes related to alcohol abuse.  She then departed 
from the guidelines calculation in the presentence report and 
the plea agreement by lowering Yusuf’s criminal history 
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category to two, with a total offense level of 14, resulting in a 
sentencing range of 18 to 24 months.  In addition to making 
that adjustment, the District Court said, “I believe a variance is 
warranted … based upon the post-conviction conduct that Mr. 
Yusuf has described[.]”  (JA at 465.)  The District Court then 
imposed a total sentence of 30 months – six months for Count 
1, plus the mandatory 24 months on Count 2 – with six months 
of home detention and three years of supervised release.  The 
government contemporaneously objected to the sentence on 
several bases, including the District Court’s “determination 
that defense counsel did not breach the plea agreement.”  (JA 
at 477.) 
 
The government timely appealed both cases and asked 




A. Breach of Plea Agreements5  
 
According to the government, Campbell and Yusuf 
breached their plea agreements by arguing for sentences that 
were not within their respective guidelines ranges.  Again, 
central to this common issue are the provisions in the plea 
 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
5 When the question of whether a defendant breached a 
plea agreement has been properly preserved for appeal, our 
review is de novo.  United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 




agreements stating that the U.S. Attorney’s “Office and [the 
defendant in each case] … agree that neither party will argue 
for the imposition of a sentence outside the guidelines range 
that results from the agreed total guidelines offense level”6 (JA 
at 199, 333), and that “[t]he parties agree not to seek or argue 
for any upward or downward departure, adjustment or variance 
not set forth herein.”  (JA at 199, 332.) 
 
Campbell argues that the statements on his behalf were 
permissible because they simply encouraged the Court to apply 
the § 3553(a) factors.  He also points to his counsel’s statement 
that “I have not raised any issue as to the guideline range.”  (JA 
at 288.)  Yusuf similarly contends that his proportionality 
argument was appropriate and that he was compelled to make 
it to advocate for fairness in sentencing.  In neither case do we 
think the defendant-appellee’s arguments justify the statements 
made at sentencing.   
 
1. Legal Standard for Determining 
Breach 
  
 Our decision here is guided by United States v. 
Williams, a case in which we considered whether a defendant 
had breached the provisions of a plea agreement nearly 
identical to the ones before us now.  510 F.3d 416, 417-18 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  As a matter of first impression, Williams also 
 
 6 Again, sentencing ranges are a function of not only the 
pertinent offense level but also of the defendant’s criminal 
history ranking, and neither Campbell nor Yusuf disputed their 
criminal history scores as calculated by the U.S. Probation 
Office.   
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determined what standard should govern when deciding 
whether a defendant has committed a breach.  Id. at 417.   
 
 In Williams, the plea agreement stated that the U.S. 
Attorney’s “Office and [the defendant] … agree that neither 
party will argue for the imposition of a sentence outside the 
Guidelines range that results from the agreed total Guidelines 
offense level.”  Id. at 418-19.  Further, the parties agreed “not 
to seek or argue for any upward or downward departure or any 
upward or downward adjustment not set forth herein” and 
agreed also that the guidelines range for the appropriate offense 
level was reasonable.  Id. at 419.  At sentencing and in his 
sentencing memorandum, defense counsel said that he did not 
dispute the offense level, but he argued for a downward 
departure in the criminal history category, as well as variances 
under the § 3553(a) factors.  Id. at 419-20.  The government 
appealed, arguing that the defendant had breached his plea 
agreement.  Defense counsel responded that, because the 
sentencing guidelines are only advisory, “Booker requires the 
Court to do a reasonableness analysis, when you consider those 
things, you can depart even though we stipulated it.”  Id. at 420. 
 
 In determining what standard should apply, we first 
recognize the well-established rule that “plea agreements, 
although arising in the criminal context, are analyzed under 
contract law standards.”  United States v. Erwin, 765 F.3d 219, 
228 (3d Cir. 2014).  That is so whether the government or the 
defendant is the allegedly breaching party.  Williams, 510 F.3d 
at 424.  In line with general principles of contract 
interpretation, we typically construe ambiguities against the 
government, given its customary role in drafting such 
agreements.  Id. at 422 (“[I]n ‘view of the government’s 
tremendous bargaining power [courts] will strictly construe the 
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text against [the government] when it has drafted the 
agreement.’” (quoting United States v. Floyd, 428 F.3d 513, 
516 (3d Cir. 2005))).   
 
 We went on to emphasize in Williams, however, that “a 
plea agreement necessarily ‘works both ways.  Not only must 
the government comply with its terms and conditions, but so 
must [the defendant].’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Carrara, 
49 F.3d 105, 107 (3d Cir. 1995)).  “[A] defendant should not 
be permitted ‘to get the benefits of [his] plea bargain, while 
evading the costs[,]’” we said.  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Bernard, 373 F.3d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Considering the 
needs of the criminal justice system generally, we observed 
that failure to “enforce a plea agreement against a breaching 
defendant … would have a corrosive effect on the plea 
agreement process.”  Id.  Therefore, “[w]hen a defendant 
stipulates to a point in a plea agreement, he ‘is not in a position 
to make … arguments [to the contrary].’”  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Melendez¸ 55 F.3d 130, 136 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Our 
analysis led us to conclude that, “[t]he essential question [in a 
breach analysis] is whether the alleged breaching party’s 
conduct is consistent with the parties’ reasonable 
understanding of the agreement.”  Id. at 425 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  Applying that standard, we 
determined that the defendant then before us had breached the 
plea agreement, and so we remanded for resentencing in 
accordance with the plea agreement.  Id. at 428.   
 
 Our esteemed colleague Judge Joseph Weis dissented in 
Williams.  He acknowledged “that as a general matter a 
defendant should not be permitted to renege on a valid and 
clear sentencing stipulation and a plea agreement.”  Id. (Weis, 
J., dissenting).  But he argued that, because the agreement in 
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Williams only specified the offense level and not the criminal 
history category, the defendant had not breached the agreement 
when his counsel argued for a departure based on the criminal 
history category.  Id. at 429-30.  Particularly pertinent to issues 
before us now, Judge Weis stated that defense counsel also did 
not breach the agreement by arguing for a variance based on 
the § 3553(a) factors, “because the District Court invited and 
allowed the argument at the sentencing hearing.”  Id. at 430.  
He reasoned that “[t]o deny the sentencing judge the ability to 
carry out his statutory duty and responsibility through consent 
of the parties seems to undermine the sentencing procedure 
Congress has mandated.”  Id. at 432.   
 
 Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Williams 
looked to earlier precedents that considered whether the 
government had breached a plea agreement by statements it 
made at sentencing.  While each case required a fact-specific 
inquiry, “the basic rules are clear.”  United States v. Hodge, 
412 F.3d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 2005).  When the government is 
alleged to have violated a plea agreement, we ask whether the 
“conduct [at issue] is inconsistent with what was reasonably 
understood by the defendant when entering the plea of guilty.”  
United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 939 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(citation omitted).  Although “[t]he government need not 
endorse the terms of its plea agreements ‘enthusiastically[,]’” 
id. at 941 (citation omitted), “[t]he government must adhere 
strictly to the terms of the bargains it strikes with 
defendants[.]” Hodge, 412 F.3d at 485 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
 For example, in United States v. Badaracco, the 
government assented in the plea agreement that, given the 
defendant’s conduct, a potential two-point enhancement of the 
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offense level should not apply.  954 F.2d at 939.  For that 
enhancement to apply, the defendant would have had to take 
significant affirmative steps to conceal his offense.  Id. at 940.  
At sentencing, the government said that, in reality, “there was 
an affirmative step taken by [the defendant] indicating that he 
was concealing something[.]”  Id. at 939 (emphasis omitted).  
We concluded that the government’s “remarks about 
concealment were meant to serve as a possible basis for the 
district court to ignore the stipulation in the plea agreement[,]” 
and were therefore a breach of the plea agreement.  Id. at 941.   
 
 Later, in United States v. Nolan-Cooper, when the 
government made an argument in response to questions from 
the district court, we considered whether it was a breach of the 
plea agreement.  155 F.3d 221, 238 (3d Cir. 1998).  The 
government had agreed not to oppose the defendant’s request 
for a three-level downward departure for acceptance of 
responsibility.  Id.  Nevertheless, at the sentencing hearing 
counsel for the government stated, “the Government does not 
believe that the defendant gave complete information.”  Id.  
Concluding that the government’s comments undermined the 
defendant’s claim that she should receive the full offense-level 
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, we determined 
that the government had violated the plea agreement.  Id.  We 
expressly rejected the argument that our analysis should be 
altered because the government’s comments were made in 
response to a question from the district court.  Id.  “While such 
questions may place the government in an uncomfortable 
situation, it still must inform the court that it cannot answer the 
question without breaching its plea agreement.  Sometimes ‘the 
better part of valor is discretion.’”  Id. (quoting William 




2. Whether Campbell Breached His Plea 
Agreement 
 
Here, the government argues that Campbell, like the 
defendant in Williams, explicitly argued for a sentence below 
the guidelines range in breach of his plea agreement.  We 
agree.  
 
As noted by the District Court, defense counsel’s 
advocacy would be “more appropriate in a case where a 
variance is still provided for in the plea agreement and that’s 
not a part of [Campbell’s] plea agreement.”  (JA at 288 
(emphasis added).)  Paragraph 1 of Campbell’s plea agreement 
states that the government and Campbell “agree that neither 
party will argue for the imposition of a sentence outside the 
Guidelines range that results from the agreed total Guidelines 
offense level.”  (JA at 199.)  In addition, Paragraph 7 of the 
agreement unambiguously prohibits Campbell from “seek[ing] 
or argu[ing] for any upward or downward departure, 
adjustment or variance not set forth herein.”  (JA at 199.)   
 
Despite that clear language, at sentencing Campbell 
twice requested a sentence of no jail time, in response to 
questions by his counsel.7  (JA at 287 (stating “I would hope 
 
7 The government further argues that Campbell 
“exacerbated the breach” in his sentencing memorandum when 
he reminded the District Court that it has discretion to look 
beyond the guidelines, closing the memorandum by saying 
“the only question left to answer is does one treat Steven 
Campbell by the calculated Guideline formula or by an 




Your Honor would consider probation, house arrest, 
community service, anything other than jail time[,]” in 
response to defense counsel’s question of what a just 
punishment would be); JA at 290 (asking the Court to “grant 
[him] any punishment, except for jail time”).)  Those 
sentencing requests were indisputably below the agreed-upon 
guidelines range.   
 
Campbell contends that he did not violate the plea 
agreement because he simply encouraged the Court to apply 
the § 3553(a) factors as permitted under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 32(i) and did not raise any issue as to the 
applicable guidelines range.  That argument is wholly 
unpersuasive.  As we recognized in Williams: 
 
nothing in the plea agreement prevented the 
District Court from departing downwardly or 
imposing a non-Guideline sentence on its own 
accord.  The plea agreement did not purport to 
 
21; JA at 221-23.)  The government also points to letters of 
support attached to the memorandum advocating for leniency 
in sentencing (some asking for a non-custodial sentence).  But 
the government raises these arguments for the first time on 
appeal. (JA at 268 (failing to object to Campbell’s sentencing 
memorandum in its subsequent memorandum, instead stating, 
“[i]n accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, 
Campbell has not sought a variance”).)  Because Campbell’s 
statements at sentencing, which the government did promptly 
object to, breached the plea agreement, we need not determine 
whether the government forfeited its arguments based on 




restrict the Court’s duty to consider the § 3553 
factors.  Rather, the agreement merely prohibited 
[the defendant] from making arguments 
regarding those issues.  If [the defendant] wanted 
to make a departure argument, it would have 
been prudent to negotiate a different agreement 
with the government.  
 
Williams, 510 F.3d at 425-26.   
 
 Similarly, although courts must give both defense 
counsel and the defendant an opportunity to speak before 
imposing a sentence, we agree with the government that Rule 
32(i) does not give defendants license to disavow their 
obligations under a plea agreement.  See United States v. Ward, 
732 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2013) (declaring that “the 
defendant’s right of allocution is not unlimited”).  To hold 
otherwise would allow defendants to reclaim rights they 
bargained away to minimize sentencing exposure.  That 
“would make the current system of plea agreements untenable 
because it would render the concept of a binding agreement a 
legal fiction[,]” Williams, 510 F.3d at 423, thereby 
jeopardizing an “essential” and “highly desirable” component 
of the administration of justice in criminal cases.  Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971).  Campbell breached 
his plea agreement and did so blatantly, to his own detriment. 
 
3. Whether Yusuf Breached His Plea 
Agreement 
 
 Yusuf’s case presents a much closer question, given its 
unusual procedural history (a resentencing following the 
sentencing of a co-conspirator for the same conduct in front of 
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a different district court judge) and the more nuanced argument 
the defense presented to the District Court.  The foundational 
provisions of the plea agreement are, however, essentially the 
same as in Campbell’s case.  Paragraph 1 of Yusuf’s plea 
agreement stated that the government and Yusuf “agree that 
neither party will argue for the imposition of a sentence outside 
the Guidelines range that results from the agreed total 
Guidelines offense level.”  (JA at 333.)  In addition, Paragraph 
12 of the plea agreement unambiguously prohibited Yusuf 
from “seek[ing] or argu[ing] for any upward or downward 
departure, adjustment or variance not set forth herein.”  (JA at 
334.)       
 
 Yusuf’s counsel acknowledged that he was bound by 
the plea agreement, but he nevertheless indicated that imposing 
the lowest guidelines sentence would be grossly 
disproportionate to Yusuf’s co-conspirator’s sentence “from a 
mathematical standpoint[.]”  (JA at 429.)  Specifically, defense 
counsel said that “simple math tells you that [the lower end of 
the guidelines range] is ten times, ten times the amount of time 
that [Yusuf’s co-conspirator] got.  I just don’t see how we can 
all stand here and say, well, that somehow is a way, you know, 
the way this rolls out.”  (JA at 429-30.)   
 
 The unusual facts in Yusuf’s case implicate at least two 
important procedural policies.  First is the need for sentencing 
courts to have all material facts.  As the District Court 
emphasized, Yusuf presented the “anomaly of two low level 
folks who clearly are a part … of … a vast conspiracy[,]” 
charged for the same crimes based on essentially the same 
conduct but sentenced by different judges.  (JA at 430.)  Those 
anomalous circumstances put the District Court and the 
defense in a particularly difficult position, given the strictures 
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of the plea agreement.  Had Yusuf and his co-conspirator both 
been sentenced by the same judge, Yusuf may not have felt the 
need to so plainly point out the proportionality problem posed 
by his co-conspirator’s sentence, because the judge would 
almost certainly have been aware of it.  
 
 While acknowledging that concern, the government 
nevertheless cites Nolan-Cooper to argue that the plain 
language of the bargained-for plea agreement must govern, 
regardless of how uncomfortable a position that may leave a 
party in when addressing the sentencing court.  See Oral 
Argument at 5:00-6:36, http://www.circ3.dcn/iptvmedia/19-
3472_19-3697_USAv.Yusuf_Campbell.mp3; Nolan-Cooper, 
155 F.3d at 238.  That argument, however, shortchanges the 
statutory duty of district courts to consider proportionality in 
sentencing under the § 3553(a) factors, a job they will be ill-
prepared to do if not made aware of all material facts.  
Although Judge Weis’s view of the appeal in Williams did not 
carry the day, we take to heart the wisdom of his observation 
that we should avoid eliminating a key source of information 
from sentencing judges and thereby impeding their ability to 
carry out their statutory duties.  Williams, 510 F.3d at 432 
(Weis, J., dissenting) (“To deny the sentencing judge the 
ability to carry out his statutory duty and responsibility through 
consent of the parties seems to undermine the sentencing 
procedure Congress has mandated.”). 
 
 Along the same lines, the duty to consider the § 3553(a) 
factors includes a responsibility to take account of facts that 
arise after a plea agreement has been struck.  The government 
essentially conceded the importance of after-arising facts when 
it stipulated in Yusuf’s plea agreement that, “if this Office 
obtains or receives additional evidence or information prior to 
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sentencing that it determines to be credible and to be materially 
in conflict with any stipulation in the attached Schedule A, this 
Office shall not be bound by any such stipulation.”  (JA at 328.)  
It is equally important to ensure that defendants are able to 
notify the sentencing court of material after-arising facts, even 
when bound by plea agreement provisions like the ones at issue 
here.  
 
 The second policy we must bear in mind is the central 
role that plea bargaining plays in our criminal justice system.  
“Because a plea agreement is a bargained-for exchange, … we 
reach the same conclusion when a defendant breaches a plea 
agreement as we would reach if the government breached.”  
Williams, 510 F.3d at 422 (citation omitted).  To hold 
otherwise would leave the government with no meaningful 
recourse if it performed its side of the agreement but did not 
receive the benefit of the deal in return, potentially leading to 
a chilling effect on plea bargaining overall.  Such a result 
would be intolerable “because our criminal justice system 
depends upon the plea agreement process.”  Id. at 423 (citation 
omitted).   
 
 With those considerations in mind, and consistent with 
our precedent describing the government’s obligation in 
similar situations, we hold that Yusuf did breach his plea 
agreement.8  Central to our decision is the fact that defense 
 
8 Yusuf also argues that the same government 
prosecutor did not object to similar statements made during co-
conspirator Adekunle’s sentencing hearing months earlier 





provisions).  He references the following exchange from 
Adekunle’s sentencing: 
 
Defense Counsel: Another issue that the Court should 
consider is the previous sentence to the co-defendant, 
which was imposed by another judge, of 27 months. I 
would urge the Court to consider that portionality [sic] 
in sentencing – 
 
The Court: Just to make a clear record, state the name 
of the person and the nature of the sentence. 
 
Defense Counsel: Yes, sir. It was Mr. Yusuf, and he 
received a 27-month sentence …. I am constrained from 
arguing a below guideline sentence.  The lowest 
guideline sentence under the six-month split sentence 
would still be above Mr. Yusuf’s sentence….  
 
The Government: So let’s just look at Count 1, and I 
know defense counsel brought to your attention [i.e., the 
sentence of Mr. Yusuf], as she should, and I’m going to 
bring to your attention misuse of sentencing….  
 
The Government: So, Your Honor, we have a situation 
where, yes, I think Your Honor has to take Mr. Yusuf’s 
sentencing into account to some degree, but Your Honor 
has to also take into account all the other sentencings. 
 
(JA at 368-74 (emphasis added).)  While we are sympathetic 
to Yusuf’s argument that the government’s position at 




counsel not only pointed out the existence of Adekunle’s lower 
sentence but went on to suggest that the bottom of the 
guidelines range was therefore too long a sentence for Yusuf.     
 
 Although we agree with the District Court that it would 
be wrong to prevent Yusuf from bringing the fact of 
Adekunle’s sentence to the District Court’s attention (see JA at 
439), here Yusuf did more than merely present a fact.  He went 
on to affirmatively advocate for a sentence below the agreed 
upon guidelines range.  The distinction may be a fine one, but 
it is important.  Had Yusuf only informed the District Court of 
Adekunle’s sentence and reminded the Court that he was 
bound by the plea agreement, the Court may well have intuited 
the argument that was left unsaid.  Cf. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 
at 238 (noting the prosecution’s obligation to “inform the court 
that it cannot answer the question without breaching its plea 
agreement”).  But leaving it unsaid is the difference between 
breaching and not breaching the agreement.9  See Williams, 
 
proportionality argument, we agree with the government that 
the advocacy in Adekunle “differed quantitatively and 
qualitatively” and therefore Yusuf had no reasonable basis to 
rely on the government’s actions in Adekunle’s case.  
(Appellant Supp. Ltr. at 1.)  As the government points out, 
Adekunle’s counsel twice pointed out that she was bound by 
the terms of the plea agreement and limited her advocacy to 
“bringing the necessary facts and circumstances to the Court’s 
attention.”  (JA at 378.)   
 
 9 Recognizing the delicate balance of interests at play in 
these circumstances, we respectfully encourage our colleagues 




510 F.3d at 422 (“[U]nder the law of this circuit, [a defendant] 
cannot renege on his agreement.  When a defendant stipulates 
to a point in a plea agreement, he is not in a position to make . 
. . arguments [to the contrary.]”) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).              
 
4. Remedy for Breach 
 
 “When the government breaches a plea agreement, the 
general rule is to remand the case to the district court for a 
determination whether to grant specific performance or to 
allow withdrawal of the plea.”  Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 241.  
That principle also applies when the defendant breaches the 
plea agreement, and, in this case, specific performance means 
resentencing.  “[W]e have observed that ‘when the government 
requests specific performance at the hands of a defendant’s 
breach [of the plea agreement], ... resentencing under the terms 
of the executed plea agreement might be the only appropriate 
remedy.’”  Erwin, 765 F.3d at 231 (quoting Williams, 510 F.3d 
at 427-28). 
 
 “It is also the rule in this circuit that if specific 
performance is the applicable remedy, the defendant must be 
resentenced by a different district judge than the one who 
presided over the now-vacated original sentence.”  Nolan-
Cooper, 155 F.3d at 241.  We hasten to reiterate that 
“remanding to a different district court judge does not reflect 
upon the District Judge’s prior decision” and that the remand 
“is not attributable to any error by the sentencing judge.”  
 
never easy, to be particularly mindful of the strictures on 




Williams, 510 F.3d at 428 (citation omitted).   Rather, “[a] 
sentencing judge could be influenced inadvertently by the 
breaching party’s prior arguments when the case is remanded 
for re-sentencing.”  Id.  Therefore, consistent with the 
government’s request in these two cases, we remand to 
different district court judges for resentencing.10   
 
B. Campbell’s Motion to Suppress11 
 
 Campbell cross-appealed the denial of his motion to 
suppress.  He claims that the police officer unnecessarily 
prolonged the traffic stop in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.12  His argument fails. 
 
10  Our concurring colleague has well expressed our 
respect for the judges who imposed sentence in Campbell’s and 
Yusuf’s cases.  Since we are compelled to direct resentencing 
by different judges, however, we note that there may be 
efficiencies in sending Yusuf’s case to the same judge who 
sentenced Yusuf’s co-conspirator, Adekunle.  
 
11 We review the denial of a motion to suppress for clear 
error as to the underlying facts, but exercise plenary review “as 
to its legality in light of the court’s properly found facts.”  
United States v. Donahue, 764 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting United States v. Crandell, 554 F.3d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 
2009)). 
 
 12 To the extent Campbell may be asserting lack of 
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, that argument also 
fails.  “A police officer who observes a violation of state traffic 





 Campbell says that the officer impermissibly prolonged 
the stop to continue an “eyeball search” while Campbell looked 
for his registration and proof of insurance.  He is correct that 
any inquiries unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop that 
“measurably extend [its] duration” are unconstitutional, 
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015) (citation 
omitted), but “ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop … 
which serve the purpose of enforcing the traffic code” certainly 
are constitutional, United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179-
80 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 
408 (2005)).  “Typically such inquiries involve checking the 
driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding 
warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s 
 
United States v. Thompson, 772 F.3d 752, 759 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(citation omitted).  That analysis is objective.  Therefore, what 
matters is not what is in the mind of the officer making the stop 
but whether, given the particular circumstances, a reasonable 
officer could articulate sound reasons for it.  See Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996); see also Ashcroft 
v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 739 (2011) (Courts will “not look 
behind an objectively reasonable traffic stop to determine 
whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate other 
potential crimes was the real motive.”)  In Campbell’s case, 
there is ample evidence that a reasonable officer could rely on 
to articulate particularized reasons for the traffic stop.  The 
officer testified that he first ran Campbell’s plates because of a 
license plate violation, and, after discovering the owner of the 
vehicle had a suspended license, he verified that Campbell was 
the driver before pulling him over.  That testimony was 
supported by camera footage documenting the stop. 
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registration and proof of insurance.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 
355.  Officers should be reasonably diligent in performing 
those tasks, and the Supreme Court has stated that the best 
indication of whether an officer has been reasonably diligent is 
by “noting what the officer actually did and how he did it[.]”  
Id. at 357. 
 
 Here, the officer did not unnecessarily prolong the stop.  
Approximately five minutes elapsed from the time the stop 
commenced to when Campbell was arrested.  Although the 
officer suggested that Campbell look in the console again for 
his insurance card, the search for the insurance card and 
registration was a plainly valid reason to continue the stop.  
Furthermore, there was nothing nefarious in the suggestion to 
look in the console, as Campbell had not yet produced the 
necessary documents and the console is a commonly used 
storage compartment in vehicles.  There was no error in the 
District Court’s ruling that the officer did not unnecessarily 
prolong the stop.13  
 
13 Campbell claims he was stopped because he is Black; 
however, he has provided no basis to support an Equal 
Protection claim.  See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 
813 (1996) (“We of course agree with petitioners that the 
Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based 
on considerations such as race.  But the constitutional basis for 
objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is 
the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.  
Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause 






 Because both defendants breached their plea 
agreements, albeit to different degrees, we will vacate their 
sentences and remand for resentencing.  In addition, we will 
affirm the denial of Campbell’s motion to suppress. 
McKee, J. concurring 
 I join my colleagues’ thoughtful opinion in its entirety.  
I write separately only to emphasize two concerns.  First, as the 
Majority Opinion explains, the fact that we are remanding to a 
new judge for resentencing in no way reflects upon the two fine 
judges who imposed the sentences in these cases.1  Both are 
thoughtful and experienced jurists with many years of 
distinguished service to the bench and their communities.  
However, as the Majority notes, our precedent requires that 
whenever we remand for resentencing because a plea 
agreement has been breached, a different judge must conduct 
the resentencing.2  
  
 Second, our holding should not be read as suggesting 
that a sentencing judge cannot interact with a defendant, the 
defendant’s family, or anyone else whom the judge may want 
to hear from at sentencing to determine the appropriateness of 
a particular sentence.  Each of the judges on this panel have 
been trial judges and we are well aware of how agonizingly 
difficult it can be to impose a sentence in a criminal case.  
Sentencing someone to a period of imprisonment impacts 
families and communities as well as the defendant.  In order 
for judges to discharge their obligations to the defendant, to 
victims of crime and to the community, it is imperative that 
they be able to engage in a dialogue with a defendant and the 
defendant’s family, as well as anyone else who may be able to 
better inform the judge about a defendant or the circumstances 
surrounding the offense of conviction.  Such dialogue often 
does much more than assist in deciding upon a sentence. The 
discussion with a defendant is particularly important because it 
may go a long way towards convincing the defendant that s/he 
was heard and treated fairly.  This, in turn, may well afford the 
defendant some measure of the respect and decency necessary 
to a successful return to the community at the completion of 
the sentence. 
  
 Courts should not feel that they are between the 
proverbial “rock and a hard place” by encouraging a defendant 
to speak while remaining cognizant of the strictures imposed 
 
1 See Maj. Op. at 25. 
2 Id. 
 2 
by a plea agreement and our opinion today should not be 
interpreted in that vein.  What occurred here went beyond an 
attorney affording the judge an opportunity to hear from a 
client or facilitating a client’s right of allocution.  The 
proceedings here can best be described as “an invitation to 
breach.”  This is best demonstrated by the conduct of 
Campbell’s attorney.  
  
 During the sentencing hearing, when asked whether he 
had “anything further,” Campbell’s attorney replied: “Yeah. 
I’ve got an argument to make.”3  And argue he did.  Although 
counsel attempted to describe what was to follow as 
Campbell’s right of allocution,4 as my colleagues explain, it 
was indeed an argument and it was a flagrant breach of the plea 
agreement.5  After Campbell addressed the court and informed 
the judge about his background, expressed remorse, and gave 
certain assurances about how he would conduct himself in the 
future, his attorney asked: “How does giving you leniency 
reflect upon the seriousness of your offense?”6  This was, of 
course, a not-so-veiled invitation to mitigate the § 
3553(a)(2)(A) factor.7  
  
 Nor did counsel stop there.  Instead, he forged ahead 
and asked his client to lend the court a helping hand by 
suggesting an appropriate and just sentence.  Counsel asked his 
client: “What is a just punishment for your offense?”8  Not 
surprisingly, Campbell did not respond that it would be a 
sentence consistent with the plea agreement.  Rather, he asked 
for a sentence that was totally inconsistent with the plea 
agreement.  He stated: “I would hope Your Honor would 
consider probation, house arrest, community service, anything 
 
3 JA at 279. 
4 Id. (“[M]y client has got an allocution he’d like to make as 
well as a statement he’d like to give to the Court.”).  
5 See Maj. Op. at 20. 
6 JA at 286. 
7 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) requires the court to consider 
“the need for the sentence imposed-- (A) to reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and 
to provide just punishment for the offense.” 
8 JA at 287. 
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other than jail time.”9  He had, of course, agreed to plead guilty 
in return for a sentence that would include incarceration.  Thus, 
while purporting to acknowledge the plea agreement, counsel 
encouraged his client to ask the court for anything but the 
agreed upon sentence. 
  
 Counsel then proceeded to pour more gild on the lily 
just in case the court had somehow managed to miss his client’s 
“ask.”  He asked Campbell, “Why will giving leniency protect 
the public from further crimes by you?”10  Campbell then 
assured the court that he had “learned [his] lesson” and would 
be crime free “for the rest of [his] life.”11  Undeterred by the 
Government’s well-founded objection, counsel plowed still 
deeper and asked the judge to give his client a break despite the 
negotiated plea.  Speaking through his client, counsel asked: 
“Why should [the judge] give you a break?”12 
  
 As the Majority notes, plea agreements “are analyzed 
under contract law standards.”13  The law has long taken this 
approach even though negotiated plea agreements are indeed a 
very strange breed of contract.  Not only does the Government 
have “tremendous bargaining power[;]”14 it is also hard to 
imagine another context in which the law enforces a “contract” 
where one party knew s/he faced years of imprisonment (or 
even execution in some cases) if s/he didn’t agree to the other 
party’s terms. 
  
 Nevertheless, the law has traditionally applied contract 
principles to plea agreements, and we thus require that parties 
to a plea agreement not breach the terms of a negotiated plea.  
Here, attorneys for both Yusuf and Campbell breached those 
terms.  Campbell’s attempt to provide the court with additional 
information is a textbook example of verbal compliance 
accompanied by the old “wink and a nod.”  This certainly does 
 
9 Id.   
10 Id. at 289. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Maj. Op. at 14 (citing United States v. Erwin, 765 F.3d 219, 
228 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
14 Id. (citing United States v. Floyd, 428 F.3d 513, 516 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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not mean that one who signs a plea agreement forfeits the right 
of allocution and thereafter can make absolutely no statement 
to the court.  It does mean that counsel cannot orchestrate a 
presentation that is clearly intended to shred a plea agreement 
while purporting to merely inform the court and safeguard a 
client’s right of allocution.  
